On June 24, 2026, members of the House Judiciary Committee debated antitrust enforcement and the impacts of deregulation on the commercial aviation sector. At the hearing, entitled “The 30,000 Foot View: Competition and Regulation in the U.S. Airline Industry”, the Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust brought forward expert witnesses in economics, law, and aviation to explore risks of air carrier market concentration and the policies best suited to encourage airline competition.  

Underlying the hearing was the corpse of Spirit Airlines, which had carved out an important role as an ultra-low-cost carrier (ULCC) before first filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in August 2025 and then ceasing all operations in May of this year. Members’ explanations for Spirit’s failure split sharply along party lines: Republicans attributed blame to a lawsuit by the Biden administration’s Department of Justice in 2023 blocking a proposed merger with JetBlue, while Democrats instead cast responsibility on rising jet fuel prices amid the war in Iran. Beyond the partisan antitrust clash, members and witnesses found room for more productive preliminary discussions on the issue of slot allotment and potential reforms to gate assignment and airport infrastructure access. 

Witnesses: 

• Chris Sununu, CEO and President, Airlines for America 

• Kristian Stout, Director of Innovation Policy, International Center for Law and Economics 

• Timothy Ravich, Senior Counsel, Tressler LLP 

• Nancy Rose, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economic Analysis, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice  

Antitrust Effectiveness 

Members and witnesses agreed that competition had proven essential to providing passengers with lower prices and more route options. Kristian Stout raised the concept of the ‘Spirit effect,’ which identifies the downward price pressure that a new, lower cost market entry (e.g., Spirit) applies on legacy carriers.  Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD), minority ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, praised the price discipline and innovation that followed on routes that Spirit started flying. However, in this light, members voiced concern over the increasingly concentrated nature of the commercial aviation market. Rep. Scott Fitzgerald (R-WI), chairman of the subcommittee, claimed that the ‘big four’ airlines – American, Delta, United, and Southwest – operated 80% of domestic air travel. (As noted by Governor Chris Sununu, this figure can vary significantly depending on the metric used: passengers, flights, vehicle miles, or passenger miles). In the eyes of Rep. Raskin, this highly concentrated market represented nothing less than an ‘oligopoly’ and seriously threatened the availability of affordable flights. 

Sharp disagreements emerged when assessing the federal government’s antitrust interventions into the increasingly uncompetitive market. Democratic members, along with Professor Nancy Rose, defended the Biden administration’s legal action to prevent Spirit from merging with JetBlue. Rep. Becca Balint (D-VT), ranking minority member of the subcommittee, asserted that allowing the merger would have eliminated crucial competition for budget-conscious passengers and raised prices on Spirit-operated routes by as much as 40%. Rose argued that rejection of the merger was not responsible for Spirit’s shutdown; instead, it lengthened the operation of Spirit’s ULCC model by two additional years. She made clear that mergers were not universally harmful, claiming that mergers between small budget airlines with complementary rather than competing route networks (for instance, Spirit and Frontier) could enhance competition. However, the proposed merger with JetBlue threatened to consolidate competing flights and eliminate downward price pressures, especially on low-service routes serving budget-conscious passengers. 

By contrast, Republican members, along with Stout and Timothy Ravich, laid the blame for Spirit’s failure squarely with the Biden administration’s aggressive antitrust agenda. Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH), chairman of the full committee, made the case that a combined Spirit and JetBlue, representing just 10% of domestic market share, would have been better able to compete with the big four airlines and enhanced competition. While Spirit’s prices may have increased marginally from ultra-low-cost rates to JetBlue’s standard low-cost fares, according to Rep. Jordan, this was far preferable to Spirit going out of business entirely. Stout asserted that even the court had found a merged company would have increased competition along the most popularly flown routes; however, overly broad antitrust doctrine prevents mergers that limit competition in any markets, so the proposal was blocked to prioritize the needs of a few over the common interest. 

Jet Fuel Prices and the War in Iran 

Democratic members continuously diverted attention towards what they saw as the true cause behind Spirit Airline’s failure: not government regulation, but high jet fuel prices due to the war in Iran. Rep. Balint castigated the administration for what she labelled as the President’s “unconstitutional war of choice” and cited comments by the chair of Spirit’s board of directors attributing the airline’s inability to recover to the sustained spike in oil prices due to closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Rep. Raskin laid out the case that as jet fuel prices doubled, ultra-low-cost carriers like Spirit simply couldn’t afford to continue operations. 

Republican members rebutted these assertions, instead framing Spirit’s closure as a result of continual financial hardships that should have been averted through its proposed merger. While Sununu conceded that jet fuel prices, in addition to recent government shutdowns, had adversely affected airlines, he maintained that Spirit was in a state of long-term financial distress and that the Iran war alone was not to blame. Representative Derek Schmidt (R-KS) posited that the Biden DOJ had failed to adequately account for the potential for price spikes in its evaluation of Spirit’s financial health – an especially notable omission in the aftermath of jet fuel price spikes following Russia’s invasion into Ukraine. Stout suggested that the issue ran deeper and that a focus on short-term viability over long-term financial outlook in an uncertain market was a systemic problem of current antitrust enforcement doctrine. He urged Congress to establish requirements for probability-weighting, essentially forcing DOJ officials and courts to consider potential future scenarios in evaluating the financial need for corporate consolidation. 

Slot Allotments and Infrastructure Access 

Members and witnesses appeared more aligned on potential reforms to the slot allotment system and access to airport infrastructure, including gates. While airlines are allotted flight slots at only seven of the country’s airports, Stout suggested that the system, meant to alleviate congestion, was increasing the barrier to entry for new entrants in some of the country’s most valuable markets. Rep. Fitzgerald explained that the FAA had freely provided incumbent airlines with perpetual ‘grandfather rights’ to slots when implementing the allotment system. Compared to processes in other countries, such as London Heathrow’s auctions of flight slots to the highest bidding airlines, the American allotment system represented a free transfer of value from the federal government to large carriers, disadvantaging smaller and newer potential market entrants. Stout advocated for a variety of potential reforms – opening up transparent slot markets, enabling secondary slot trading, or replacing the system with congestion pricing – to create a more dynamic, market-driven allotment process.  

Representative Jesús “Chuy” García (D-IL) directed attention towards the ongoing airline turf war at Chicago’s O’Hare airport. While the airport’s unique status as a ‘dual hub’ has traditionally provided passenger the benefits of both expansive flight networks and competitive pricing, Rep. García claimed that United was engaging in anti-competitive behaviors to drive out American. By flooding the market with flights, some designed to exert financial pressure rather than make profits for the airline itself, United was seeking to push out competition responsible for keeping prices low. The escalating turf war has already driven Southwest out of the airport, exerted pressure on struggling budget airlines, and forced the FAA to institute flight caps for O’Hare. Rep. García voiced support for reforms to the slot and gate allotment system to prevent the loss of competition. 

Rep. Darrell Issa (R-CA) argued that a lack of shared gates, open to carriers without enough services to maintain dedicated gate infrastructure, was a key contributor into Spirit’s failure. Stout claimed that multi-year lease agreements between airports and airlines with provisions limiting construction were throttling the expansion of airport capacity. Despite disagreements on most antitrust subjects, Rose and Stout expressed a joint desire to expand access to airport infrastructure and reduce barriers to market entry. 

Consumer Protections and Deregulation 

Members further debated the broader role of federal regulations within the commercial aviation sector. Republican members and witnesses consistently lauded the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, which ushered in a competitive landscape to replace the tightly regulated market in which the Civil Aeronautics Board determined routes, carriers, and flights. Rep. Fitzgerald argued that data shows that deregulation pushed prices down and consumer choices up. He claimed that “maximum reliance on market forces”, not government intervention, was the way to meet modern consumer needs. Sununu likewise cited growth in the flying public from 20% to 50% of Americans each year since deregulation, with Americans of a wider array of socioeconomic backgrounds able to afford flights. 

Rep. Balint took an alternative approach, focusing on the recent rollback of consumer protection regulation plans issued by the FAA under President Biden. She excoriated the Trump administration for seemingly prioritizing industry profits over basic assurances for passengers, such as mandatory compensation for delayed or cancelled flights and price transparency. Rep. Balint made the case that flying was no longer merely a ‘perk’ but rather an essential service for Americans, whether visiting family, engaging in commerce, or seeking education. In her view, this essential function justified government intervention. 

Sununu countered that ‘European-style’ consumer protection plans, while well-intentioned, would have overburdened airlines and adversely affected passengers. For instance, airlines would have been penalized for merely changing the tail number of a flight’s assigned aircraft. Moreover, regulations required airlines to award exorbitant monetary compensation, on top of existing refund policies, in case of delays and cancellations – even those due to certain ‘act of God’ events beyond airline control. 

Stout further argued that airlines depended on operational flexibility, not strict mandates, to best serve customer needs. He pointedly claimed that consumer protections had put additional financial pressure on budget carriers, which operate on extremely low profit margins, compared to legacy airlines, which were better posed to absorb costs. In this way, overly onerous regulations threatened to drive out smaller competitors and further increase market concentration among the big four airlines. 

For more information about antitrust and competition in the aviation sector, see the Government Accountability Office’s recently released report on airline competition.