On Thursday, March 27, the U.S. Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Aviation, Space, and Innovation convened a hearing entitled, “NTSB Preliminary Report: The DCA Midair Collision.” Members called on representatives from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the United States Army to provide insights regarding the midair collision incident over DCA earlier this year and the subsequent preliminary report released by the NTSB. 

Witness List 

• Jennifer Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board 
• Chris Rocheleau, Acting Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration 
• Brigadier General Matthew Braman, Director, Army Aviation, United States Army 

Context 

On January 29, 2025, at around 8:45 pm, a United States Army Blackhawk helicopter operating under the callsign PAT25 and a CRJ700 commercial jet aircraft operating as flight PSA 5342 collided midair close to Washington National Airport (DCA). The resulting collision resulted in 67 fatalities: 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, 60 passengers, and 3 U.S. Army crew members from the U.S. Army 12th Aviation Battalion.  

PSA flight 5342 was a regularly scheduled domestic flight from Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport in Wichita, Kansas and was on its final descent into DCA. PAT25 departed from Davison Army Airfield at Fort Belvoir, Virginia and was conducting an annual evaluation of night vision goggle technology. The tragic loss in life was the first major air-to-air collision in the United States in around 15 years. The resulting tragedy prompted an investigation led by the NTSB, which published a preliminary report on March 11, outlining the factual information related to the incident. The preliminary report does not include further analysis of the incident, which will be included in a final report, set to be released in one year’s time (barring any significant changes), according to NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy. While the preliminary report does not include analysis, the NTSB released a set of findings and urgent recommendations for the FAA’s adoption.  

In its report, the NTSB wrote that the separation distances between helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, like commercial jets, landing at DCA’s runway 33 are “insufficient and pose an intolerable risk to aviation safety by increasing the chances of a midair collision.” Chair Homendy emphasized this point during the hearing, using the phrase repeatedly. The NTSB provided the FAA with two urgent recommendations: 

1. Prohibit operations in helicopter Route 4 between Hains Point and the Woodrow Wilson bridge when DCA runways 15 and 33 are in use for departures and arrivals.  

1. During times when helicopter Route 4 is closed for commercial air traffic at DCA, the FAA must designate an alternate route for helicopters traveling between Hains Point and the Woodrow Wilson bridge.  

Immediately following the accident, the FAA announced its own actions, by suspending helicopter traffic in the area surrounding DCA. The initial restriction exempts helicopters from entering the airspace for medical emergencies, active law enforcement, air defense, or presidential transport. Following the March NTSB preliminary report and urgent recommendations, the FAA has made the suspension of non-essential helicopter traffic around DCA permanent, eliminating mixed-traffic between helicopters and commercial fixed-wing aircraft. The FAA also has permanently closed the helicopter Route 4 and prohibiting the use of DCA runways 15 and 33 while helicopters are conducting urgent missions near the airport. Additionally, Acting Administrator Rocheleau discussed the FAA’s efforts to analyze mixed traffic at other airports across the country, and assessing the needs of changing airspace design and policies to ensure safe operations.  

Thursday’s hearing provided an opportunity for members of the Subcommittee to question the witnesses on the various areas of concern regarding the DCA collision. The frustration in the room was palpable. At various moments, Senators were noticeably frustrated and voiced their concerns and frustrations in some tense back-and-forth with the witnesses. Everybody in the room recognized the importance and severity of the matter, and witnesses and Senators alike were clear in their commitments to ensuring safety and accountability.  

Near-Miss Data 

The NTSB report outlining its urgent recommendations provided statistics on the occurrences of near misses between commercial aircraft and helicopters. Between October 2021 and December 2024, there were around 15,000 of these near misses. Subcommittee Chair Jerry Moran (R-KS) and full committee Ranking Member Maria Cantwell (D-WA) asked about the many near misses. Both senators were eager to hear from the witnesses about the clear writing on the wall that the number of near misses at airports indicated some systemic problem.

Subcommittee Ranking Member Tammy Duckworth (D-IL) referred to multiple hearings on airport near misses and unsustainable air traffic control systems, indicating that there has been an ongoing conversation about aviation safety risks. In response, Homendy and Rocheleau discussed the challenge of working with substantial amounts of data. According to the witnesses, the FAA receives a large amount of data related to air traffic operations and safety, including data on near misses. Rocheleau pointed out that the FAA reviews all of the incidents it receives, but that something was missed in understanding the data. The FAA is turning to machine learning models to analyze data, which can help to identify trends proactively and then mitigate risks early. Rather than responding to an accident, the idea is to be proactive and implement safety policies that prevent accidents.  

Frustration over ADS-B  

One of the issues of most concern throughout the hearing was related to Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast systems or ADS-B, which is a communications technology used in aviation to create an accurate interface between aircraft and air traffic control. There are two types of ADS-B technology: ADS-B out and ADS-B in.  

ADS-B Out reports an aircraft’s position (latitude and longitude), velocity, and altitude. Essentially, the aircraft sends its information out towards the air traffic control operations on the ground, via a transponder. ADS-B Out provides an accurate form of surveillance, helping air traffic control and other aircraft track positions more efficiently. As noted by Homendy during the hearing. ADS-B Out reports aircraft position, velocity, and altitude once per second compared to every 4-6 seconds with radar. ADS-B is required for aircraft operating in Class B airspace. Class B airspace refers to airspace around the country’s busiest airports. Several senators inquired about ADS-B systems, because the U.S. Army helicopter involved in the DCA collision had its ADS-B Out system turned off, effectively cutting off transmission of its data to anyone. This was a point of major frustration for senators.  

In 2019, the FAA issued a change to its rule requiring the use of ADS-B Out transmission in Class B airspace. The rulemaking provided an exception, removing the ADS-B Out transmission requirement from operations conducted by Federal, State, and local government entities in matters of “national defense, homeland security, intelligence, and law enforcement.” In 2023, responding to an inquiry from Representative Eleanor Holmes-Norton (D-DC), the Department of Defense stated that the Army Aviation Brigade stationed at Fort Belvoir executed its missions with the ADS-B Out turned off. The missions conducted by the Army Aviation Brigade are sensitive missions involving national defense and defense support of civil authorities, and as such are exempted from the ADS-B Out transmission requirement.

Various Senators referenced this exemption and letter from the Defense Department in their questioning. Brig. Gen. Braman noted that not all flights conducted follow this exemption, but in the context of the missions flown such as the one during the collision, the exemption applies. The frustration was most pronounced during an exchange between full Committee Chair Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Braman. Cruz referred to the decision to turn ADS-B Out off as “unacceptable” and demanded that the Army act on its own accord to address the issue or be ordered to.  

In response to questioning from the senators, Rocheleau said that the FAA would now require ADS-B Out transmission from all flights in the DCA airspace, with some very limited exceptions. Sen. Cantwell expressed some concerns with the observation that there are other helicopter operators other than the Army that exist in the DCA airspace, including the Secret Service or local law enforcement. The senator urged the FAA to be considerate in ensuring the safe operations of the airspace and not be as flexible with its exemptions related to ADS-B requirements. 

The second type of ADS-B system is ADS-B In, wherein an aircraft equipped with the technology receives data from other aircraft and sometimes weather information from the ground. ADS-B In, which is not mandated by FAA, improves an aircraft’s ability to know the location, velocity, and altitude of other aircraft, thereby increasing situational awareness independent of the air traffic control system. Responding to Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Homendy stressed the value of equipping commercial aircraft with ADS-B In systems and added that it has been the position of the NTSB to incorporate ADS-B technology since 2008.  

The adoption of more ADS-B In and reducing the flexibility of ADS-B Out exemptions may overall assist in improving air traffic awareness, both for air traffic control operators and pilots. Full ADS-B participation is a strategy for improved tracking, traffic flow, and aircraft separation.  

Altitude Concerns 

Within the NTSB’s timeline of events, it notes that there was some discrepancy between the altitude reporting of the U.S. Army Blackhawk. The pilot had reported being at 300ft while the instructor pilot reported being at 400ft close to the area of the collision. Senators Ted Budd (R-NC) and Ed Markey (D-MA) asked about this noted difference in altitude reporting. In response to Sen. Markey, Homendy stated that it was still early to make any conclusions about what occurred during this moment with conflicting altitude readings.  

Air Traffic Control 

At several points during the hearing, members of the Subcommittee brought up air traffic control workforce issues as a point of discussion. For several years, there have been numerous discussions in the House and Senate regarding air traffic control staffing shortages. Along with staffing shortages, aging infrastructure is another element of the air traffic control conversation that has come up time and again. Aging infrastructure and low staffing can hinder the ability to conduct safe air operations. Rocheleau committed to ensuring that the FAA will bring in the “best and brightest” into its ATC operations, particularly relying on college programs that bring students into ATC training programs.  

Oversight and Coordination 

The witnesses from Thursday’s hearing represented three of the main agencies involved in the ongoing investigation from the January collision: The NTSB, the FAA, and the United States Army. Throughout the hearing, there was some indication that improved cooperation between the players would be critical going forward. For example, Braman indicated to the group that the Army is willing to work with its partners at the FAA to understand the situation and work to improve air safety. Should the FAA expand the mandate requiring ADS-B Out transmission, Braman was clear that the Army would operate under the FAA’s authority.  

The NTSB has a crucial role in all this. As an independent agency, the NTSB can provide recommendations for other government agencies to improve safety. As mentioned by Sen. Klobuchar and emphasized by Homendy, the NTSB has many open recommendations that have yet to be implemented by various agencies including the FAA. It is critical that agencies take the NTSB efforts seriously and implement the recommendations that come from them. If the current airspace environment is in such a way, that NTSB Chair Homendy uses the term “intolerable risk to aviation safety,” then it behooves us all to practice due diligence in implementing NTSB recommendations. All of the parties present during the hearing were clear in their commitment to ensuring that such a tragedy must be prevented in the future, which is admirable. The test ahead is following through on these commitments.