On Wednesday March 4th 2026, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, a case dealing with the liability of interstate freight brokers in state level safety claims. The case seeks to resolve a circuit split over whether interstate freight brokers fall under preemption in the Federal Aviation Administration Act (FAAA) from state-based torts or if under the safety exception of this same legislation brokers can be held liable for accidents caused by their carriers. The oral arguments focused on defining brokers’ connection to motor vehicles, implications on the freight industry, and state by state consistency. The case has garnered attention from the freight industry and from the Administration, with an assistant to the U.S. Solicitor General arguing as a friend of the court for the brokers. 

The outcome of the case, which will likely be released by June, will have direct impact on the extent to which brokers consider safety when selecting carriers. Additionally, the case brings up important questions for freight and transportation safety policy. At its core, the case raises questions about how far the legal liability for safety responsibility should extend up a supply chain. The oral arguments also raised questions about the impact of state-by-state variations in safety liability on deregulated interstate commerce and in a competitive marketplace with both small and large brokers. The case and oral arguments also highlighted the existing state of safety standards for brokers and carriers and potential gaps in safety validation.   

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC Background  

In December 2017, Shawn Montgomery was struck by Yosniel Varela-Mojena in Illinois, leading to an amputation of Montgomery’s leg and severe disfigurement. Montgomery pulled onto the shoulder of the road to inspect his truck when Varela-Mojena, another truck driver, rear-ended him off the roadway at a high speed. Montgomery brought state-based negligence claims against the driver, the tractor owner, the company leasing the trailer, and the freight broker. The broker disputed the claims as being covered by the Federal Aviation Administration Act (FAAA) of 1994’s Section 14501(c)(1) preemption of state suites against brokers and their business practices “related to a price, route, or service.” The original legislation was passed with the congressional intent to deregulate interstate commerce through removing state by state patchworks of rules for interstate freight.  

However, the FAAA preserves the role of states in the regulation of safety with respect to motor vehicles in Section 14501(c)(2)(A). The district court found that freight brokers do fall within the safety exception (“with respect to motor vehicles”) to federal preemption of interstate trucking. Therefore, the freight broker could be found negligent. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court disagreed, finding that Section 14501(c)(1) preemption applies to state law claims over freight broker hiring practices and potential negligence in motor carrier selection. The Eleventh Circuit has also previously found that the safety exception requires a more direct connection to vehicle operation, in alignment with the Seventh Circuit’s finding. This is a divergence from the Ninth and Sixth Circuits which have found in similar cases that state claims can be brought against brokers for selection decisions under the safety exception.  

Oral Arguments  

Earlier this month, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case, seeking to resolve the circuit split and ongoing disputes over the application of the safety exception and state suit preemption to trucking brokers. Paul D. Clement delivered the oral argument on behalf of the Petitioner, Montgomery. Theodore J. Boutrous provided the oral argument on behalf of the Respondents. Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, spoke as a friend of the court in support of the Respondents.  

Defining Brokers’ Connection to Motor Vehicles 

Clement argued that the case should be decided based upon the language of the safety exception. He said that while the preemption clause discusses a widescale view of transportation operations, the safety exception relates to decisions with direct connection to motor vehicles, such as hiring decisions made by brokers in his interpretation. According to Clement, the point of the tort is to keep dangerous vehicles off the road and to prevent bodily harm to third parties from the “80,000 pound motor vehicle.” He emphasized that brokers have a direct role in determining which vehicles are on the road. Clement said the limit for liability in an accident is proximate cause as opposed to “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” elements related to the accident.  

In contrast, Boutrous emphasized the disconnection between brokers and motor vehicles, describing brokers as matchmakers between goods and carriers but having no direct power over the driver or the operation of the motor vehicle. He said, “Brokers don’t own, operate, or control motor vehicles” and that there is no safety exception clause for the primary service provided by brokers of coordinating between shippers and carriers. Justice Thomas asked if brokers could be successful in courts based on the proximate cause argument. Boutrous agreed that they could but emphasized the additional unnecessary litigation costs this would place on brokers.   

Implications on the Freight Industry  

In an amicus brief, business groups argued that expanding broker liability would both go against the FAAA and would place a significant cost burden on brokers to try to monitor motor carriers. Arguing as a friend of the court, assistant to the US solicitor general Sopan Joshi raised concerns that the additional oversight costs of placing brokers within the safety exception for state torts would push smaller brokers out of the market, allowing larger brokers to dominate. He argued that such monopolization goes against the original intent of the FAAA.  

During oral arguments, the Justices were interested in the practicality of holding freight brokers responsible for safety in motor carrier selection. Justice Kavanaugh asked Clement about the ability of motor carriers to effectively screen drivers and brought up contemporary Administration initiatives around English proficiency of truck drivers. Clement said brokers can require carriers to complete appropriate testing and will be disincentivized through potential liability from hiring cheaper carriers with questionable safety standards. He emphasized the easiest way for brokers to protect themselves from potential suits is through hiring high quality carriers. He also mentioned that half of carriers have a single driver, reducing the distance between brokers and drivers. Boutrous said this greatly expands the scope of brokers’ existing responsibilities in matching carriers to shippers and that it is the role of carriers to monitor drivers.  

When asked by Justice Kagan if this liability would extend to shippers, Clement agreed. On the same day as the oral argument, the Texas Supreme Court heard arguments on a case pertaining to the liability of shippers hiring motor carriers when a third-party is injured. Clement said that if in some states both shippers and carriers can be held liable for accidents, but brokers cannot, some of these players may seek to reclassify themselves as brokers. Joshi shared that the Administration has not taken a position on the shippers’ question.  

State by State Consistency  

Boutrous argued that enabling state tort claims would create a patchwork of state standards, infringing upon efficient interstate commerce and the intention of the FAAA to liberate interstate operations.  Boutrous also emphasized the role of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) in licensing freight carriers and said most states endorse these regulations. Clement conversely cited that 94 percent of carriers have not had a safety exam by the federal government, and Justice Sotomayor questioned the ability of FMCSA to adequately review the 700,000 registered carriers every year.  

Justice Sotomayor also emphasized the role of states in determining drivers to be unfit and inquired why brokers could not mandate these same standards. Justice Jackson said the Congress might have wanted to maintain the existing status quo in which states are able to determine safety liability, saying “Safety regulations always create a patchwork.” Clement agreed, adding that most states have this tort.  

Some of the Justices raised concerns about inconsistency between interstate and intrastate safety exceptions, as the safety exception does not exist for intrastate transportation. Clement did not have a definitive answer as to why this divergence exists but rather emphasized that Congress intentionally created the interstate safety exception “to preserve state regulatory authority with respect to safety in motor vehicles” and that the case should focus on this exception.