On Wednesday, January 21, the U.S. House Judiciary Subcommittee on Oversight held a hearing entitled “Embedded Threats: Foreign Ownership, Hidden Hardware, and Licensing Failures in America’s Transportation System.” Members called on witnesses to discuss the ways Chinese actors have gained access to U.S. infrastructure systems, the threat they pose, and the policy solutions to address Chinese control over US infrastructure systems.  

Witness List 

Emily de La Bruyere, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

Chris Spear, President and CEO, American Trucking Association 

Rocky Cole, Co-founder, iVerify 

Robert Knake, Former Deputy National Cyber Director for Management and Budget, Office the National Cyber Director 

Chinese Influence over US Infrastructure 

In his opening remarks, Subcommittee Chair Jefferson Van Drew (R-NJ) framed Wednesday’s hearing around a single idea: control. He and Subcommittee Ranking Member Jasmine Crockett (D-TX) agreed that Chinese-manufactured batteries, cameras, sensors and other components embedded in U.S. infrastructure systems give Chinese firms opportunities to collect data and gain access. That dynamic could effectively split control of critical infrastructure between the United States and China. 

Building on that theme, witness testimony emphasized that the presence of Chinese technology in U.S. infrastructure is not hypothetical but already occurring in several ways. Bruyere described the risk as a three-part vulnerability: access to information, the ability to shape information, and disruption of operations. 

 Access to information 

First, integrating Chinese-manufactured products into U.S. infrastructure gives Chinese companies access to data. Bruyere pointed to LiDAR deployments as one example, citing Chinese-made LiDAR technology used across infrastructure assets such as airports, bridges, and street intersections. Chinese firms controlled around 80 percent of the LiDAR industry in 2023, limiting the ability for agencies and companies to use LiDAR systems produce outside of China.  

LiDAR is a remote-sensing technology that uses pulses of laser light to generate detailed images of surfaces. In infrastructure contexts, it can help detect road defects, support emergency response, and inform maintenance decisions. These systems can generate location-specific data about how infrastructure is built and used and the widespread deployment of Chinese-made sensors can create data collection and access risks. 

Access plus the ability to shape information 

Second, Bruyere raised a concern that embedded technology could do more than collect data—it could also enable a company to shape and manipulate information. In other words, corrupted systems could feed incomplete or false data back to infrastructure operators and commercial users. 

For example, a large share of cranes used at U.S. ports in 2023 were manufactured by the Chinese company ZPMC. Sensors installed in cranes track container movements and shipment patterns to facilitate port operations. However, that monitoring functionality could also enable tampering, such as providing inaccurate shipping information to shippers or operators. In 2021, the FBI reported having discovered intelligence gathering equipment on ZPMC cranes delivered to the Port of Baltimore, and the firm repeatedly requested remote access for cranes operating at US ports, particularly on the West Coast. While there was no evidence that the equipment led to any disruptions, US lawmakers remain concerned over the threat of disruption.  

Unlike the risk of data access, there is no evidence to date of companies having manipulated or shaped information. However witnesses discussed this as a capability that if exercised, would pose significant challenges. 

 Disruption of infrastructure operations 

The third risk discussed by Bruyere and Knake is that of disruption. That disruption could take many forms: interrupting telecommunications, interfering with air traffic operations, halting port functions, or disabling traffic systems such as streetlights at intersections. Interference in infrastructure can reduce the movement of goods, delay emergency response, and constrain access to essential resources. Witnesses and members characterized this disruption risk as severe. 

Bruyere and Knake warned that the risk of disruption would increase in the event of a conflict between the United States and China, because the Chinese government could leverage influence over Chinese companies to move from collection and manipulation to disruption.  

Cole argued that disruption by Chinese actors has previously occurred. He pointed to recent U.S. reporting on Chinese state-sponsored cyber activity (including groups such as Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon) targeting telecommunications and other critical systems in the US, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. 

Policy Solutions 

The witnesses presented several policy options to counter the threat posed by Chinese technologies embedded in US infrastructure. One option, as discussed by Bruyere, is to halt any further penetration of Chinese technology in US infrastructure systems, as Congress did with rolling stock for mass transit systems several years ago. While this may mitigate the growth in future risks, it does not address current vulnerabilities. 

Another suggested solution was to prohibit any company or transportation system that uses Chinese technology or components from receiving federal dollars. While this would reduce the use of such technology in publicly funded infrastructure, it would be less apt to affect choices by private companies, which tend to choose products that are cost-effective and reliable. As Knake noted, Chinese manufacturers often offer components that are functional and also highly cost-competitive, making them attractive for companies looking for the most cost-saving and efficient technology for their products. While highways, airports, and passenger rail and transit rely heavily on public funding, much of the freight sector does not. As a result, a funding restriction may have limited impact on those entities that are not heavily reliant on federal support and still leave significant vulnerabilities in the transportation system.  

Bruyere’s second proposal was to create clear definitions for what qualifies as a Chinese company or a Chinese-influenced entity. The purpose would be to ensure U.S. policies are targeted, consistent, and enforceable—reducing ambiguity that can lead to loopholes, or inconsistencies. 

Knake proposed the option of diversifying supply chains away from China but not assuming that US-based or allied-based companies are automatically safe. Instead, he emphasized consistent verification of components regardless of origin, including components sourced from U.S. firms or allied countries. 

Several Democratic members argued that any discussion of infrastructure security must grapple with federal capacity. Full Committee Ranking Member Jamie Raskin (D-MD), Ranking Member Crockett, and Rep. Henry Johnson (D-GA) questioned whether the federal government can effectively counter the threat of Chinese control if key agencies like the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) have lost staff and expertise during the first year of the Trump administration. They also criticized the administration’s dissolution of the Department of Homeland Security’s Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) in 2025, arguing that these decisions weakened technical and operational expertise needed to respond to emerging threats. While CIPAC was dissolved in 2025, DHS is setting up a new group to take its place.   

Additional Issues 

Several republican members and one witness brought up the issue of English Language Proficiency (ELP) requirements for obtaining a CDL. They argued that drivers without adequate ELP can pose safety risks and, by extension, vulnerabilities in the transportation network.  

Subcommittee Chair Van Drew claimed that several accidents involving trucks occurred in part because the truck drivers could not speak English and therefore could not understand road signs. However, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration does not track language proficiency or citizenship status in its truck crash data, so the claim that language proficiency is a factor in crashes is unfounded. The chair and Rep. Brandon Gill (R-TX)’s comments suggested that the absence of an ELP requirement makes it easier for foreign actors to obtain a CDL, potentially causing accidents and disrupting the transportation network. 

This portion of the hearing appeared to sit separate from the theme of Chinese technology embedded in infrastructure. The discussion was less of a conversation about addressing control over US infrastructure and more of an opportunity to promote the administration’s immigration enforcement priorities.