PART 5: CLOSING THE TRUST FUND GAP BY INCREASING FEDERAL REVENUES

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Part 5: Closing the Trust Fund Gap by Increasing Federal Revenues

The amount of federal spending on infrastructure has increased in nominal dollars to keep pace with the costs of infrastructure construction, which have increased with inflation. Spending also expands as priorities expand and transportation agencies take on additional missions and requirements. Maintaining the current set of missions and programs with neither cuts nor bailouts will require new revenues to the Highway Trust Fund. This section considers three options that predominate in current discussions. Importantly, each would raise its own issues with regard to collection and distribution.

Considerations:

Collection and Administrative Costs: Collecting revenues has some costs to it, but the percent of those costs relative to the amount of revenue collected can vary considerably. In general, increasing the rates of existing revenue streams will not add any new administrative costs and therefore will make the percent of costs going to administration go down. Creating new collection systems have higher costs.

Revenue systems can also vary based on the extent to which they will be prone to "leakage," or the amount of unpaid revenues due to tax evasion or loopholes. A smaller number of taxable entities contributes to both low administrative costs and low rates of leakage.

Distribution Effects: On the transit side, HTF dollars are distributed in amounts calculated according to formulas set in law, which are based on population as well as transit system factors such as passenger miles and revenue miles. Highway "formula" funding is no longer truly a formula with distribution based on any system factors. Instead, funds apportioned to states are based on the percentage of the national total that they received in 2009, and they are only re-adjusted if a state receives less than 95 percent of their payments into the highway account.

When highway funds are highly supplemented with General Fund transfers, then all states receive more than they remit in taxes and therefore no state is a "donor" to the HTF. Adding new revenues to the Highway Trust Fund and achieving solvency could result in a "donor-donee" fight that has not really been seen since apportionments began exceeding revenues and the formulas were locked. Even without intentional adjustments to distribution "formulas", increasing revenues would result in adjustments to the amounts that states receive because more states would trigger the 95 percent guarantee provision in law that stipulates that states receive an apportionment amount equal to at least 95 percent of the amount the state paid in revenues to the HTF. The upward

adjustments to the states that have paid more in taxes results in a downward adjustment to the apportionments of all other states.

Achieving solvency could be an opportunity to update apportionments to reflect changes in population and driving patterns that have occurred in the past twenty years. Politically, it would be likely be easiest to renegotiate formulas in the context of increasing spending as well as revenues, as that would make it possible to update formulas and still avoid any state receiving a smaller apportionment than they received in the prior year. If new revenues backfill the current shortfall without any increase to total spending, then any change to the distribution of HTF dollars would result in winners and losers.

Economic concerns. Economists make two points about modeling user taxes or fees. First, if you increase an excise tax or fee on an item or activity high enough, you will depress demand for the item being taxed to some degree and push down the yield (what economists call elasticity of demand). However, motor fuel has been shown to be particularly resistant to elastic demand changes, at least at the price increase rates we will consider here, and driving is such a commonplace and necessary activity that it has been shown to be remarkably inelastic as well.

Second, any increase in excise or payroll taxes, or a user fee, means that someone, somewhere, has less net income to declare on their taxes, and therefore any excise or payroll tax increase will cause some amount of decrease to federal income tax receipts. CBO and OMB formerly rounded this off to 25 cents of reduced income tax receipts for every dollar of increased excise or payroll taxes. Since the 2017 tax cuts, this level has fluctuated by year, and is around 26 or 27 cents per dollar of increased excise or payroll taxes. This would not make a difference to the Highway Trust Fund itself, which gets credited with the gross amount of any increased revenue, but it does affect larger federal budget issues.

Options to Raise Revenue:

I. Increase and Index Current Revenues

In the near term, CBO says that each penny of the 18.3 cent-per-gallon gasoline tax will bring just under $1.6 billion per year into the Highway Trust Fund, and each penny of the 24.3 c.p.g. diesel tax will bring in just over $400 million. This means that if Congress were to increase those motor fuel tax rates, each penny of rate increase would bring in an additional $2 billion per year to the HTF on a net basis.

We calculate that the bare minimum motor fuels tax increase necessary to maintain bare minimum Highway Trust Fund solvency at baseline spending rates is around 17.8 cents per gallon, starting with an immediate 10.0 cents per gallon on October 1, 2026 and increasing slightly each year thereafter. At the gradual increases calculated, the increase

to fuel taxes would reach 14.2 cents by FY31 and would reach the full 17.8 additional cents per gallon by 2036. This would raise around $300 billion in additional tax revenue over ten years to the HTF (ignoring the income tax revenue lost because of the excise/payroll offset). Because of the imbalance between the leverage ratios in the two accounts, it would be necessary to give the Mass Transit Account over 30 percent of the increased revenues in the early years.

Table 16: Bare Minimum Motor Fuels Tax Increase Levels Necessary to Maintain HTF Solvency at Feb. 2026 Baseline HTF Spending Levels

(Assumes complete inelasticity of demand for fuel)

	FY26	FY27	FY28	FY29	FY30	FY31
Current Tax Rates						
Gasoline/gasohol (cents/gal.)	18.3	18.3	18.3	18.3	18.3	18.3
Diesel (cents/gal.)	24.3	24.3	24.3	24.3	24.3	24.3
Minimum increase necessary (cents/gal.)		**+10.0**	**+2.2**	**+0.4**	**+0.8**	**+0.7**
Resulting Tax Rates						
Gasoline/gasohol (cents/gal.)		28.3	30.5	30.9	31.7	32.5
Diesel (cents/gal.)		34.3	36.5	36.9	37.7	38.5
Increased Revenue (Billion $)		**$20.0**	**$24.5**	**$25.5**	**$27.2**	**$28.8**
% of Increase to Mass Transit Acct.		30%	39%	37%	36%	35%

Eno Center for Transportation table.

II. New Federal Annual Registration Fee

With roughly 300 million vehicles registered across the nation, a fee per registered vehicle has the potential to raise significant revenues. Even with two percent of revenues allocated for the cost of collecting revenues, a vehicle registration fee has the potential to raise approximately $2.8 billion for every $10 of registration fee imposed.

Table 17: Vehicle Registrations by Class Nationwide

	Autos	Trucks	Buses	Motorcycles
Vehicles Estimate	96.9 million	177.2 million	967 thousand	9.5 million
Revenue per $10 fee *(millions)*	$950	$1,737	$9	$93

Eno Center for Transportation table. Data source: FHWA Highway Statistics Table MV-1

A federal registration fee offers a range of advantages and drawbacks. Chief among the advantages is the high potential revenue. While not a user fee, and a weaker proxy for use of roadways compared to the fuel taxes for internal combustion engine vehicles, it would capture the growing number of electric and alternative fuel vehicles. Therefore, the revenues would not erode should those numbers continue to increase.

The shortfall between current outlays and revenues is approximately $33 billion per year. At this level of spending, we estimate that a $120 fee on all vehicles would close the revenue gap. Alternatively, if Congress were to repeal all existing HTF revenues and replace them with a registration fee, a fee of $290 per vehicle would raise approximately $80 billion per year, covering the total HTF spending. (Congress could also consider pairing a higher fee on heavier vehicles that disproportionately impact roadways and a lower fee on smaller passenger vehicles, similar to the higher fuel tax rates for diesel fuel.)

The collection system poses the largest hurdle and disadvantage of a registration fee. All vehicles are required to be registered and have a title for the purpose of identification and demonstrating ownership, but the authority to register and title motor vehicles is a state authority. The federal role is limited to the licensing of U.S. government-owned vehicles and the registering of companies that operate commercial vehicles engaged in interstate commerce or passenger transport. The latter requirement, which mandates display of a USDOT number by interstate commercial vehicles, still does not supplant the requirement for state level vehicle registration.

A registration fee of $120 per year on all vehicles would fill the current HTF shortfall.

Federal vehicle registration requirements apply only to commercial vehicles over 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight. There is no current federal registration for light-duty vehicles, and creating a wholly new system for administering federal registrations for the nearly 300 million vehicles in the country would impose a significant administrative cost burden. As a result, proposals for a federal registration fee generally assume that such a system would have to be layered onto the existing state-level systems for fee collection to keep administrative costs to manageable levels. Even so, integrating a new

federal fee into disparate state collection systems would need to be carefully implemented, and the limits of state and federal authorities pose unique challenges.

Challenges and considerations:

Differences in State systems and requirements: All states require vehicles to be registered and licensed before being used on public roadways; however, registration practices vary greatly among states, including different registration renewal lengths (e.g. annual versus multi-year registrations), different fee structures and information collection systems, and different agency authorities.

Self-certification based on available information: State agencies typically rely on self-reporting of vehicle information; many states do not have vehicle inspection requirements and may not be able to confirm the accuracy of self-reported data. This may constrain the level of vehicle differentiation that could be included in a federal fee structure. For instance, fee amounts that vary based on vehicle weights could pose challenges for states to verify, as weights are not required to be tracked for passenger cars as part of Vehicle Identification Numbers (VINs).[1] For the categories of trucks and "multipurpose passenger vehicles"—e.g. SUVs, vans, and minivans—the VIN is required to include weight but in the form of gross vehicle weight rating class. This rating class is based on the vehicle weight plus total passenger and cargo weight that can be safely transported by the vehicle, rather than the weight of the vehicle itself. Similarly, fee differentiation based on fuel or propulsion type would be subject to self-reporting, as that information is not necessarily included in VINs.

Voluntary Structure: A federal requirement for state agencies to collect federal revenues would run afoul of the tenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits "commandeering" of state agencies. As a result, collection of these federal registration fees would have to be structured as a voluntary program in exchange for receipt of federal transportation program funds. Participation would likely also require authorization by state legislatures.

Ensuring State participation: If the registration fees were the sole source of revenues to support the transportation programs, then many states would find themselves collecting and remitting more funding than they received back as federal apportioned funds; this would undoubtedly dampen their willingness to voluntarily participate. The withdrawal of all "donor states" from a voluntary program structure would lead to the eventual collapse of the program.

In order to maintain full participation, a voluntary program would need ensure that states continued to see benefit in participating in the federal programs, which could be achieved in a variety of ways. States would have the incentive to continue participating if they were confident they would receive a greater amount of funding than they were collecting in fee revenue. For instance, the HTF could continue to be funded with

additional revenues collected directly by the federal government such as fuel or truck taxes, and state receipt of the full apportionment could be conditioned on their participation in the voluntary registration fee collection. State eligibility for discretionary grants could also be conditioned in a similar way. Alternatively, regulatory waivers or other benefits could be provided only to program participants. Any of these approaches would require Congress to thread a needle of having an incentive that is significant enough to ensure participation but not so significant as to run afoul of the commandeering prohibition.

Stand-alone/supplemental fee on electric and hybrid vehicles:

Electric vehicles do not consume gasoline and therefore do not contribute to the HTF through the gas tax; hybrids consume relatively little gasoline and contribute relatively little revenue. This has posed a concern to policymakers watching the total number of electric vehicles (EVs) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) increase rapidly over the last decade, with the number of EVs and PHEVs growing at an average of 36 percent per year since 2016. However, the fact is that the total number of EVs and PHEVs remain an exceedingly small percentage of the overall vehicle fleet. As of 2024, EVs and PHEVs together represented just 2 percent of all vehicles, and non-plug-in hybrids represented another 3 percent.

Policymakers could impose a fee on EVs, PHEVs, and hybrid vehicles in addition to the base registration fee for all vehicles, or as a standalone new revenue to supplement current HTF revenues. A $200 fee on all of these vehicles, which is more than twice the average amount of federal gas tax paid by U.S. drivers, would still collectively raise less than $3 billion per year.[i] This would be a meaningful supplement to other sources of revenue, and one poised to potentially grow, but in the near-term, this revenue would be woefully inadequate to close the HTF revenue shortfall on its own.

Table 18: Alternatively Fueled Vehicle Registrations Nationwide

	EVs	PHEVs	Hybrids
Vehicles Estimate	4.5 million	1.5 million	8.5 million
Revenue per $10 fee *(millions)*	$44	$15	$83

Eno Center for Transportation table. Data source: DOE State Energy Data

[i] Assuming an average of 24 MPG fuel efficiency and an average of 12,000 miles, a driver would pay $92 in federal gas taxes in a given year.

A $200 fee on all EVs, PHEVs, and Hybrids would be twice as much as average gas tax payments but still only raise $3 billion per year.

Distribution effects:

Imposing a new federal fee or tax could be done independently from changes to funding apportionments, so there would not necessarily be any distributional effects. However, a new source of revenue would result in changes to the proportion of funding that each state receives relative to their taxes paid. This could create pressure to change the formula and also–depending on the fee level and amount of revenue paid—could result in new states triggering the minimum guarantee threshold of 95 percent of taxes paid.

Due to the large increase in contract authority under IIJA provided through General Fund transfers, no state has received less than 100 percent of their tax payments in recent years, and the average formula apportionment in 2024 was 206 percent of the amount the state paid in HTF taxes. However, if a reauthorization bill relied solely on HTF tax revenues with no General Fund transfers, then many more states would trigger the 95 percent guarantee threshold.

The number of vehicle registrations has never been a factor used in state funding formulas, and therefore the states that were closer to being "donor states" previously would not necessarily be the same as those who would pay more under a vehicle registration framework. (The number of vehicles is somewhat correlated with population and with vehicle-miles traveled however, both of which were previously factors in distribution formulas.)

Table 19: Percentages by State for Vehicle Registrations vs. current HTF Contributions

State	% fleet	% HTF payment	State	% fleet	% HTF payment
Alabama	1.9%	2.2%	Montana	0.8%	0.5%
Alaska	0.2%	0.3%	Nebraska	0.7%	0.9%
Arizona	2.3%	2.1%	Nevada	0.9%	0.9%
Arkansas	1.2%	1.3%	New Hampshire	0.5%	0.4%
California	10.9%	8.6%	New Jersey	2.1%	2.2%
Colorado	1.8%	1.6%	New Mexico	0.7%	1.1%
Connecticut	1.0%	0.9%	New York	3.3%	3.6%
Delaware	0.2%	0.3%	North Carolina	3.1%	3.2%
Dist. of Col.	0.1%	0.1%	North Dakota	0.4%	0.5%
Florida	6.9%	5.7%	Ohio	3.9%	3.5%

Georgia	3.2%	3.6%	Oklahoma	1.2%	1.7%
Hawaii	0.4%	0.2%	Oregon	1.5%	1.2%
Idaho	0.7%	0.7%	Pennsylvania	3.8%	3.3%
Illinois	3.6%	3.2%	Rhode Island	0.3%	0.2%
Indiana	2.0%	2.5%	South Carolina	1.9%	2.0%
Iowa	1.3%	1.3%	South Dakota	0.5%	0.4%
Kansas	0.9%	1.0%	Tennessee	2.4%	2.5%
Kentucky	1.6%	1.7%	Texas	8.2%	12.3%
Louisiana	1.6%	1.6%	Utah	1.1%	1.0%
Maine	0.5%	0.5%	Vermont	0.2%	0.2%
Maryland	1.7%	1.5%	Virginia	2.8%	2.8%
Massachusetts	1.8%	1.4%	Washington	2.6%	1.7%
Michigan	3.5%	2.6%	West Virginia	0.5%	0.8%
Minnesota	2.1%	1.7%	Wisconsin	2.0%	1.9%
Mississippi	0.8%	1.4%	Wyoming	0.3%	0.5%
Missouri	1.9%	2.3%			

Eno Center for Transportation table. Data Source: FHWA Highway Statistics MV-1 and FE221

The green lettered states in the table above received 125 percent or less of their HTF tax payments, meaning they are currently closer to being "donor" states. The states that are shaded blue are those states that have a higher share of the nationwide vehicle fleet than their share of the payments into the HTF, with the darker shading indicating a larger percentage difference. Those states would pay relatively more if fees are collected on the basis of numbers of vehicles registered, and would be pushed toward being "donor states". As a result, the set of states that are both green lettered and shaded blue are the states that would be most apt to trigger the 95 percent guarantee threshold—Arizona and Florida.

Nearly all states would see in a significant difference between the amount of current HTF payments from their residents to the amount of payments based on vehicle registrations, but the effect will vary across states. Approximately half the states would pay more than they currently do and the other half would pay less. The change would be minimal for some states, but for others, it would represent a much more significant change. While the states of Mississippi and Delaware would see a 40+ percent reduction in their payments into the HTF compared to their payments under the current tax structures, the states of Washington, Oregon, Montana, Hawaii and the District of Columbia would all see increases of more than 45 percent.

Table 20: Percent Change in HTF Contribution Between Current Gas Tax and Potential Registration Fee Structures

STATE	% Fleet	Percent paid of current HTF taxes	Percentage change in States's HTF payments under registration fee
Mississippi	0.8%	1.4%	-45.6%
Delaware	0.2%	0.3%	-42.3%
New Mexico	0.7%	1.1%	-39.2%
Wyoming	0.3%	0.5%	-37.1%
West Virginia	0.5%	0.8%	-35.8%
Oklahoma	1.2%	1.8%	-31.7%
Texas	8.2%	12.0%	-31.3%
Nebraska	0.7%	0.9%	-23.1%
Kansas	0.9%	1.1%	-22.6%
Indiana	2.0%	2.6%	-20.6%
North Dakota	0.4%	0.5%	-18.5%
Missouri	1.9%	2.3%	-16.3%
Arkansas	1.2%	1.4%	-13.8%
Alabama	1.9%	2.2%	-13.4%
New York	3.3%	3.7%	-11.4%
Kentucky	1.6%	1.8%	-9.1%
South Carolina	1.9%	2.0%	-7.1%
Louisiana	1.6%	1.7%	-5.1%
Iowa	1.3%	1.4%	-4.1%
Tennessee	2.4%	2.5%	-3.7%
New Jersey	2.1%	2.2%	-2.2%
North Carolina	3.1%	3.1%	-1.7%
Georgia	3.2%	3.3%	-1.1%
Arizona	2.3%	2.3%	-0.5%
Alaska	0.2%	0.2%	0.4%
Colorado	1.8%	1.8%	1.3%
Utah	1.1%	1.1%	2.0%
Wisconsin	2.0%	2.0%	2.3%
Nevada	0.9%	0.9%	3.0%
Idaho	0.7%	0.7%	3.6%
Maine	0.5%	0.5%	3.9%
South Dakota	0.5%	0.5%	4.7%
Virginia	2.8%	2.6%	5.5%
Illinois	3.6%	3.2%	10.8%
Pennsylvania	3.8%	3.4%	11.6%
Ohio	3.9%	3.5%	13.1%
Connecticut	1.0%	0.9%	14.1%
Minnesota	2.1%	1.7%	18.6%
Florida	6.9%	5.6%	21.6%

Maryland	1.7%	1.4%	23.5%
New Hampshire	0.5%	0.4%	23.6%
California	10.9%	8.7%	25.9%
Michigan	3.5%	2.7%	28.0%
Vermont	0.2%	0.2%	28.7%
Massachusetts	1.8%	1.4%	28.7%
Rhode Island	0.3%	0.2%	30.7%
Washington	2.6%	1.8%	45.3%
Oregon	1.5%	1.0%	48.5%
Montana	0.8%	0.5%	56.0%
Hawaii	0.4%	0.2%	104.1%
Dist. of Col.	0.1%	0.1%	136.0%

Eno Center for Transportation table. Source: FHWA Highway Statistics

Future trends

Nationwide, the total number of vehicles generally increases on an annual basis. Between 2013 and 2024, the number of registered vehicles in the U.S. increased by an average of 1 percent per year. However, this overall average masks differences within states, and in 12 states, the number of registered vehicles in 2024 was lower than the number in 2013, with particularly significant reductions in the states of Alaska, Delaware, New York, and New Jersey. The figure below shows the percentage change each year for every state, each represented by a separate dot. While the national average—represented by the solid black line—shows steady annual growth, every year there are also numerous states that have negative growth in vehicle registrations.

Figure 10: Annual Change in Vehicle Registrations by State



Eno Center for Transportation. Data Source: FHWA Highway Statistics MV-1

III. Federal VMT fee

Vehicle-Miles Traveled fees have represented an area of promise for future HTF solvency for decades. In 2009, Congress established the National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission to provide recommendations on how to fund and finance surface transportation infrastructure, and the Commission's final recommendation was to shift from the current funding approach toward fees per mile driven.[2] VMT fees are appealing for several reasons, but perhaps two most important: first, by directly charging drivers per mile traveled, VMT fees would be true user fees, unlike fuel taxes or vehicle registration fees that use other factors as a proxy for the use of roadways. Second, and most importantly, in a country that collectively travels more than 3 trillion miles per year, a very small fee per mile could raise significant revenue.

Table 21: Vehicle Miles Traveled Fee Levels with Revenue and Example Funding Equivalents

VMT fee	Revenue	Funding Equivalent
2.4 cents/mile	$78 billion per year	IIJA annual FHWA and FTA total CA, including transfers to HTF
2.8 cents/mile	$91.75 billion per year	IIJA annual FHWA and FTA funding including advanced appropriations
3.7 cents/mile	$121.95 billion per year	IIJA funding for FHWA, FTA, FRA, OST, and Amtrak

Eno Center for Transportation table

Our calculations suggest that a per mile fee of 2.4 cents would raise approximately the equivalent of the full amount of annual outlays for highway and transit programs per year. Imposing a VMT without removing the existing HTF taxes would necessitate a VMT of half that amount. A higher per mile fee would produce revenue sufficient to address the infrastructure priorities that were paid for through advance appropriations in IIJA.

Challenges and Considerations:

Multifactor Pricing potential: The 2009 Commission argued that VMT fees would not only restore the HTF finances, but they could also address the underpricing of roadways that results in congestion.[3] VMT fees could be structured as dynamic multifactor prices that would more completely reflect the full costs imposed by driving by having fees vary according to vehicle weight or emissions, time of day, congestion, location or other impacts.

Concerns: While VMT fees continue to be studied and have been implemented in some states, public concerns about VMT fees have also been widespread. These include concerns about privacy, cost impacts, unfairness to drivers of fuel-efficient vehicles, unfairness to drivers in rural areas, and others.[4] Concerns about both implementation technology needs and privacy have led some RUC programs to embrace a range of payment options, giving drivers a choice to use paper-based system or in-vehicle technology. However, maintaining a range of collection systems only increases the administrative cost challenges.

Administrative Costs: Perhaps the most significant challenge is the administrative costs of collecting VMT fees. A pilot program to evaluate administration of a federal VMT fee was authorized in IIJA but never implemented. New Zealand has a Road Usage Charge (RUC) system currently in place for light-duty electric and diesel vehicles, which costs 3 percent of revenues to administer, compared to 0.04 percent cost for the country to administer the excise tax on fuel.[5]

Tracking and Collection Technology: The NZ RUC program uses a mix of paper-based compliance and electronic distance recorders to track mileage. However, this system is what contributes to the very high administrative costs and poses challenges to enforcement and compliance. Smart phone applications and in-vehicle telematics offer the potential to lower administrative costs, though such systems would likely require opting in and would not be options for all vehicles. Beyond posing higher costs, manual systems do not support dynamic multifactor pricing.

A fee of 2.4 cents per mile would raise the equivalent of the full amount of annual outlays for highway and transit programs per year.

Distribution effects:

The blue shaded states in Table 22 are those for which their share of nationwide VMT is higher than the share of HTF payments they currently make. VMT is highly correlated with the amount of fuel used and, therefore, gas tax paid. As a result, many of the states that are already closer to being "donor" states on the basis of the taxes paid to the HTF (those states with green letters in the table below) would continue to be pushed toward being donor states if revenues were collected based on VMT and apportionments were not adjusted.

Table 22: Percentage of States VMT vs. vs. current HTF Contributions

State	% VMT	% HTF payment	State	% VMT	% HTF payment
Alabama	2.2%	2.2%	Montana	0.4%	0.5%
Alaska	0.2%	0.3%	Nebraska	0.7%	0.9%
Arizona	2.3%	2.1%	Nevada	0.9%	0.9%
Arkansas	1.2%	1.3%	New Hampshire	0.4%	0.4%
California	9.8%	8.6%	New Jersey	2.4%	2.2%
Colorado	1.7%	1.6%	New Mexico	0.9%	1.1%
Connecticut	0.9%	0.9%	New York	3.7%	3.6%
Delaware	0.3%	0.3%	North Carolina	3.8%	3.2%
DC	0.1%	0.1%	North Dakota	0.3%	0.5%
Florida	7.4%	5.7%	Ohio	3.5%	3.5%
Georgia	3.9%	3.6%	Oklahoma	1.4%	1.7%
Hawaii	0.3%	0.2%	Oregon	1.1%	1.2%
Idaho	0.6%	0.7%	Pennsylvania	3.0%	3.3%
Illinois	3.2%	3.2%	Rhode Island	0.2%	0.2%
Indiana	2.8%	2.5%	South Carolina	1.9%	2.0%
Iowa	1.0%	1.3%	South Dakota	0.3%	0.4%
Kansas	1.0%	1.0%	Tennessee	2.5%	2.5%
Kentucky	1.5%	1.7%	Texas	9.2%	12.3%
Louisiana	1.7%	1.6%	Utah	1.1%	1.0%
Maine	0.5%	0.5%	Vermont	0.2%	0.2%
Maryland	1.8%	1.5%	Virginia	2.7%	2.8%
Massachusetts	1.9%	1.4%	Washington	1.8%	1.7%
Michigan	3.0%	2.6%	West Virginia	0.5%	0.8%
Minnesota	1.8%	1.7%	Wisconsin	2.1%	1.9%
Mississippi	1.3%	1.4%	Wyoming	0.3%	0.5%
Missouri	2.5%	2.3%			

Eno Center for Transportation Table. Source: FHWA Statistics

Future trends:

The nationwide average trendline for VMT growth stays largely steady from year to year, growing at an average of just under one percent per year since 2015, although national VMT is highly correlated with the economy and shrinks during economic recessions. However, that national average masks significant variation between states. Even excluding 2020 when every state saw negative VMT growth due to the COVID-19 pandemic, between 2015 and 2024 at least 9 states every year saw a reduction in their VMT from the prior year, and there are 12 states whose total VMT was actually lower in 2024 than it was in 2015.

[1] U.S. Government Publishing Office. (n.d.). *49 CFR Part 565—Vehicle identification number requirements*. Electronic Code of Federal Regulations. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-49/subtitle-B/chapter-V/part-565

[2] National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission. (2009). *Paying our way: A new framework for transportation finance* (Final report). https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/17160

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