

MEMORANDUM FOR RUMSFELD FILES
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
At Camp David
November 20, 1972

I flew up by helicopter. At 2:15 p.m. I went into a meeting with Shultz and Ehrlichman in the new building at Camp David. Ehrlichman did most of the talking. He briefly described the President's plan to reorganize the government. Shultz was going to be the economic czar. They mentioned that they were aware that I had some possible interest in running for office again. I indicated that I had several thoughts in my mind, one was to get some foreign and military experience, another was to run, another was to leave government for a period. I indicated to them that I felt it was very important how they handled Finch's departure from government because I felt he should be properly set up in California in terms of the PR aspect, so that if he decides to run, he wouldn't suffer from some of the problems that had been reported in the press concerning his being cut out by Ehrlichman and Haldeman. At that point in the meeting, Ehrlichman left to go report to the President on what we had talked about.

Shultz and I stayed and talked a bit, and then a few minutes later we went down to see the President. I went in to see the President at 2:30 p.m. and met with the President until about 3:20 p.m. with Shultz and Ehrlichman in the room.

The President said that the Senate and the House were a joke. There was no strength there. He said the only thing that interests him in the Congress at the present time is the Campaign Committee to try and get it strong enough to do a job.

He said that he will endorse in 1974 and he has already told Finch that he would endorse him. The President told me that he will endorse and support me. He said he couldn't before, but he will now even in primaries if it will help me. He said he felt I should decide now, and not tell anybody except for a few people. If I told any more it would be stupid, and I'm not stupid. He went on to say that Adlai Stevenson III was light. He was better looking than his dad, but he had no elan, that he could be beat, and that he, the President, wanted to do what he could to help me.



He said he felt that I shouldn't go into the human resource area, HUD or HEW, and not DOT because he was going to be cutting highways and airports and that wouldn't be helpful to me politically. He said I couldn't take something less than Cabinet level, except in the foreign policy area, and then he said maybe in defense. He said that he was going to use the Cabinet and keep it small and have no extras. He said possibly Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Possibly the UN, and then he said no that wouldn't be good that isn't particularly popular in Illinois, Commerce, he said maybe the international economic thing, possibly Secretary of the Navy, CLC, NATO, EEC, he said maybe something to do with Vietnam, but he said that depends on China and Russia. He said maybe something to do with China. And then he said but the best is Europe. That is the key and you do need some international activity. I said no on Vietnam, that didn't seem to make sense to me, nor did the UN, and I quite agreed with him on HUD and HEW and DOT. He said further that I felt that it would be important that whatever I did, did not appear to be a jury rigged, specially arranged job for me. I said this because earlier he'd indicated that if I stayed at CLC for awhile, then got some foreign experience fast and then went to Illinois in June of 1973, it would probably be best. I said the problem with that is that it would be a jury rigged kind of arrangement. I said that I felt it was important that whatever I did be an important activity, a substantive activity, and not an arranged one.

He said that it is a tough for him to support people in primaries if others go in. He said that is not to say he won't do it, but it is harder, therefore the earlier I decide, the easier it is.

I said that a temporary jury rigged job would not be of interest to me personally, because I am not interested in make-work, and secondly I think it would be seen as such and handled as such and that that would be damaging. I said the people in Washington aren't stupid and they know where power runs. The President then said in his view John Anderson was no problem to him as President to endorse me in a primary. He said Anderson had a future in the House and that is where he ought to stay. He said Scott is a little tougher for him. He has been a supporter of the President's, but no matter.



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NOTE: George Shultz and John Ehrlichman were neither helpful nor harmful. They were quiet.

The President said he was going to make Elliot Richardson the Secretary of Defense. He said he was thinking about Peterson for either NATO or the EEC. He then asked George Shultz what else existed in the economic area or the international economic area. The President then said there is really no need to move on me fast, particularly since George Shultz wanted me to stay at CLC for awhile, and George Shultz made the statement that he felt there was a good chance for some visibility in the CLC transition. The President concluded by saying, "Don we will find it, we will find the right spot, and to use the chess analogy, Don, I want you to know that you are not a pawn."

